Justice Breyer could have entirely avoided this problem based on the Court's unanimous opinion that Larry Lonchar's conduct was not abusive." Instead, Breyer chose to limit the applicability of Gomez to successive petitions, and thereby prevented lower courts from using the "abuse of the writ" doctrine to dismiss first petitions.
1 0 This note further argues that Justice Breyer's protection of first petitions was consistent with congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent.
II. BACKGROUND

A. THE ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LAW
For the imprisoned, the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus is a procedural safeguard protecting personal liberty."
1 The protection of the writ originated in English common law.' 2 Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution also guarantees the writ: " [t] he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'1 3
The writ was not designed to adjudicate the guilt of a prisoner, but merely allows the prisoner to contest the validity of his or her imprisonment.' 4 Accordingly, the Judiciary Act of 17891 5 first empowered federal courts to issue the writ to federal prisoners who wanted to challenge the jurisdiction of their confining court' 6 or to challenge detention without proper legal process by the President.' 7 There was no expansion of the Great Writ's protection until 1867, when Congress also gave state prisoners the chance to contest their confinement in federal court.' 8 However, the Act of 1867 did not explicitly define the scope of the writ or the procedures associated with it.1 9 Therefore, courts in the late nineteenth century usually followed the common law practice that resjudicata 2° did not apply to a dismissed habeas corpus petition, The Supreme Court finally resolved the confusion in 1924 with Salinger v. Loise 2 5 and Wong Doo v. United States. 2 6 These two cases clearly established that res judicata does not apply to the denial of federal habeas corpus petitions 27 and laid the groundwork for what would later be known as the "abuse of the writ" doctrine. 28 Due to the availability of appellate review, the Court determined in Salinger that successive petitions should be disposed of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought. Among the matters which may be considered, and even given controlling weight, are (a) the existence of another remedy, such as a right in ordinary course to an appellate review in the criminal case, and (b) a prior refusal to discharge on a like application.
29
Soon after Salinger, the Court applied that decision's rule in Wong Doo. 30 The petitioner there presented two claims in his original petition, but argued only one. 3 ' After the district court denied his petition, he attempted to raise the abandoned claim in a successive petition which the court also dismissed. 3 2 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling because the petitioner had ample opportunity to offer proof of his abandoned claim when he brought his first petition, and had no reason for not doing so.as The Court noted that " [t] o reserve the proof for use in attempting to support a later petition, if the first failed, was to make an abusive use of the writ of court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. BIAcI's LAw DIcnONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990). 21 Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1924) . 22 Id. 23 See, e.g., McMahon v. Mead, 139 N.W. 122, 123 (S.D. 1912); ExparteHeller, 131 N.W. 991, 994 (Wis. 1911) .
24 See, e.g., Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62, 66 (S.D. Cal. 1889) . 25 265 U.S. 224 (1924) . 26 265 U. S. 239 (1924) . 27 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480 (1991) 
1948-1976: CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW PERTAINING TO
SUCCESSIVE HABEAS PETITIONS
One month after the Court decided Price, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the first statute dealing with successive federal habeas corpus petitions. 4 0 This statute allowed a federal court to dismiss a subsequent petition that presented no new grounds for relief. 41 Some interpreters believed by negative implication that Congress was also forcing courts to accept petitions that alleged any new relief grounds.42 However, this would have been contrary to common law principles recognizing that new claims could constitute abuse if a petitioner unreasonably excluded them from prior petitions. 4 3 Anticipating this confusion, the Reviser's Note to the statute pointed out that Congress did not intend to disrupt the judicial evolution of habeas principles," so the abuse of the writ doctrine which the Court developed in Wong Doo and Price remained unchanged.45 In 1963, the Court confirmed the unchanged status of the abuse of the writ doctrine in Sanders v. United States. 4 The Sanders Court dealt with a related provision of the judicial code, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allowed a federal district court to refuse to entertain a subse-SUPREME COURT REVIEW quent habeas corpus petition seeking "similar relief." 47 The Court simplified its analysis by concluding that § 2255 was the "material equivalent" of § 2244, and that § 2255 did not announce a stricter abuse of the writ standard.4 8 With this equivalence in mind, the Court moved on to describe its interpretation of § 2244's coverage. 49 The Court explained that this statute addressed only a first situation of successive petitions based on relief grounds which a court had already heard and dismissed on the merits. 5 0 The Court distinguished a second situation commonly giving rise to abuse of the writ-where a petition contains a different ground for relief, or an earlier ground for relief which the petitioner abandoned 5 -and stated that it was not within the statute's coverage. 52 Where this second situation arose, a court could avoid considering the petition's merits only if there had been an abuse of the writ. 53 The opinion then stated that a court was to use equitable principles as a guide when determining if there had been abuse, including the principle that "a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks."
54
The Court gave examples:
if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than one.., he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground. The same may be true if, as in WongDoo, the prisoner deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing. Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
55
In 1966, Congress amended § 2244, accounting for the distinction drawn by the Court in Sanders. 56 Congress wanted to "introduc[e] a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceedings." 5 7 Subsection (b) of the amended statute addressed the second situation involving successive petitions, the situation which the Sanders Court found to be outside the prior statute's coverage. 58 The amended statute allowed a court to dismiss at its discretion this type of 47 Id. at 17-18 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) [Vol. 87
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successive petition unless the petitioner alleged a new ground for relief and had not intentionally withheld the new ground or "otherwise abused the writ." 5 9 If the petitioner met these conditions, the court was required to consider the merits of the petition as long as there were no other habeas errors such as nonexhaustion of state remedies or procedural default. 60 Conversely, even when a petition was clearly abusive, Congress did not intend the amended statute to limit a court's discretion to hear the petition if the court so chose. 6 A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.64 An earlier draft of Rule 9 (b) included the phrase "was not excusable" instead of the "constituted an abuse of the writ" language. 65 However, Congress eventually decided that "the 'not excusable' language created a new and undefined standard that gave a judge too broad a discretion to dismiss a second or successive petition .... The 'abuse of the writ' standard brings Rule 9(b) into conformity with existing law." 66 Thus, similar to its enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), Congress had again codified the principles set forth in Sanders. 67 Rule 9 (a) addressed another problem in habeas corpus proceedings-delay in filing petitions-on which judicial abuse of the writ doctrine did not touch. 68 Rule 9(a) stated:
[a] petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred. 
1997]
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While this rule is directly applicable to both first and successive petitions, in either case the state must still make a particularized showing that the delay prejudiced its ability to respond. 7 0 Another rule, Rule 4, is also relevant to both first and successive petitions. 7 1 It authorizes a court to dismiss a federal habeas petition summarily when "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief ... "72 If the court can dismiss the petition on its merits, the court obviously does not have to further address those merits in another proceeding and can deny a stay of execution for a condemned prisoner. 7 3 C.
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN ABUSE OF THE WRIT DOCTRINE
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court held that the reverse principle of Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 4(a) is also true in the context of federal appeals: namely, if a court cannot dismiss a petition on its merits, the court must address those merits and stay a pending execution. 7 4 In Barefoot v. Estelle, a district court had denied a first federal habeas petition, but subsequently issued a certificate of probable cause for the petitioner to appeal to a circuit court. 75 Since this certificate of probable cause meant that the circuit court could not dismiss the petition on its merits, the Supreme Court ruled that the circuit court must grant a stay of execution pending disposition of the petitioner's claims. 76 Failing to grant the stay could have allowed the case to become moot as a result of the prisoner's execution. Two more recent decisions have also impacted the abuse of the writ doctrine. 7 8 The first came in 1991 when the United States Supreme Court decided McCleskey v. Zant. 79 The Court established a new, separate legal standard for abuse of the writ. 8 0 In addition to the Sanders example of deliberately abandoning a claim and then repleading it in a subsequent petition, 8 ' the Court decided that it would also find abuse of the writ if a petitioner raises a new claim in a subsequent petition which the petitioner did not raise earlier because of "inexcus-70 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) . 71 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (1994). 73 See Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297. 74 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 89-94 (1983 Id. at 493. This meant that "inexcusable neglect" would be present unless the petitioner showed cause for not bringing the claim earlier and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged errors. Id. at 493-94 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ; United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982) Lonchar returned a short time later to find Sweat on the telephone speaking to a 911 operator, 9 7 at which point he killed her, stabbing her 17 times in the neck and three times in the chest before leaving the condominium for the last time.
9 8
Later that evening, Lonchar went to his cousin's house. 99 He complained to his cousin that he "couldn't kill the bitch," and told his cousin that he had cut Sweat's throat. 10 0 Lonchar's cousin drove him to Chattanooga, where he caught a plane to Texas. 10 1 Police later arrested Lonchar in Mission, Texas, when he attempted to pick up money that his cousin wired to him. [Vol. 87
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Lonchar guilty on three counts of malice murder (mooting the felony murder indictments) and one count of aggravated assault. 106 He received a sentence of death by electrocution for the three counts of murder and twenty years imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction.' 0 7 After the court denied a motion for a new trial, Lonchar's case came up for mandatory appellate review over his objection, 08 and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the sentences and convictions on July 13, 1988.109 After initially refusing to authorize any collateral attacks on his conviction or sentence and writing the trial judge to request an execution date," 0 Lonchar made the first of numerous about-faces regarding his desire to die"' by authorizing the filing of a petition for certiorari which the United States Supreme Court Lonchar v. State, 369 S.E.2d 749, 754-55 (Ga. 1988) . 110 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 , 1295 . III Petitioner's Brief at 7, .
112 Lonchar v. Georgia, 488 U.S. 1019 . 113 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1295. 114 A "next friend" is a person acting for the benefit of either an infant or another person unable to look after his or her own interests or to manage his or her own lawsuit. The next friend is not a regularly appointed guardian. BLAcK's LAw DIc'rIoN~m" 1043 (6th ed. 1990 Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 642 (11th Cir. 1992) . 125 Lonchar v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 1378 . 126 Petitioner's Brief at 11, On June 23, 1995, Larry Lonchar again changed his mind and decided to file his second petition for habeas corpus relief in his own behalf in Georgia state court.l s ' He presented twenty-two claims and told the court he wished to pursue each, but that his purpose was to delay his execution in the hope that Georgia would change to lethal injection execution so he could donate his organs.' 3 9 After temporarily staying the execution, the court denied the petition on June 25, 1995, because Lonchar did not show a genuine intention to pursue most of his claims. 140 Lonchar immediately filed the same twenty-two claims in his first federal habeas corpus petition. 141 The State requested dismissal of the petition on two grounds: first, the State felt Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost six years to file his first federal petition constituted "inequitable conduct"; 14 2 and second, the State believed that Lonchar had waived his federal claims by not raising them at previous opportunities. 143 The district court found no inequitable conduct because Lonchar's petition presented significant issues concerning the validity of his conviction and sentence which no federal court had previously reviewed.'4 It noted that Habeas Corpus Rule 9 authority to dismiss for "abuse of the writ" specifically applied only to second or successive habeas petitions. 145 The court was unsure about the State's waiver claim, so it ordered a stay of execution on June 28, 1995, to consider that issue further 4 6 The next day, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the stay, asserting that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 pre- 134 Id. at 15. 135 Id. 136 
Id.
137 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 1995) . 138 Brief for Petitioner at 15, Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 . 139 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 , 1296 149 Regardless of the waiver claim, the Eleventh Circuit held Lonchar's conduct was abusive because of his lengthy delay in filing his petition and his failure to raise the issues during the "next friend" proceedings. 150 Lonchar then filed an application with the United States Supreme Court to stay the execution, and simultaneously filed a petition for certiorari.' 5 ' OnJune 29, 1995, the Court granted the stay of execution and the petition for certiorari 52 to consider whether the Court of Appeals could properly dismiss a first habeas petition for special ad hoc "equitable" reasons not within the framework of Rule 9.153
IV.
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In an opinion written by Justice Breyer, 15 4 the Supreme Court overruled the Eleventh Circuit's decision vacating Larry Lonchar's death sentence. 155 Justice Breyer first noted that when a first habeas corpus petition presents original claims that are worthy of consideration but a court still denies a stay, that court abuses its discretion by allowing the case to become moot as a result of the petitioner's execution. 15 6 Thus, although the Court was dealing with an order vacating a stay of execution, the analysis was the same as if it were considering an order to dismiss a first habeas petition. With that in mind, the Court then listed six main reasons supporting its holding that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly vacated Lonchar's stay of execution by improperly relying upon special ad hoc "equitable" reasons which neither the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules nor prior precedents embody.
157
Justice Breyer began by asserting that the court of appeals could 147 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995 . 152 Lonchar v. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 2640 . 153 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 , 1298 163 Gomez said that a "court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief."' 64 However, Justice Breyer distinguished Gomez because, unlike the court in Lonchar's case, the Court in Gomez could have justifiably dismissed the habeas petition within the existing framework of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules.' 65 Thus, Breyer argued that Gomez did not create ad hoc standards for first federal petitions, and the concurrence's reading of that opinion seriously conflicted "with Barefoots well-settled treatment of first habeas petitions."
66
The Supreme Court next answered the question of whether a court could properly use the Eleventh Circuit's special ad hoc "equitable" reasons, even though they are not within the framework of Rule 9, to dismiss a first federal habeas petition.' 6 7 In concluding it was improper to use these special ad hoc reasons, the Court noted first that the history of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shows the gradual evolu-158 Id. at 1296. 159 Id. 160 Id. at 1297 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893-94 (1983) ). 161 Id. 162 503 U. S. 653 (1992) . 163 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297. 164 Id. (citing Gome; 503 U.S. at 654). 165 Id. The court could have dismissed the petition as an "abuse of the writ" under Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) because it was a fifth attempt at review regarding an issue which the petitioner could have easily raised in an earlier petition. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW tion of formal judicial, statutory, and rules-based doctrines, and not individual judges. dismissing writs at their discretion. 168 Congress, the Rule writers, and courts had developed principles that regularized and narrowed judicial discretion. 169 Justice Breyer pointed out that those principles seek to maintain the courts' freedom to issue the writ, and they reflect a balancing of objectives which Congress normally makes, but which courts will make when Congress has not resolved the question. 170 Secondly, the majority emphasized that a court cannot ignore the principles embodied in statutes, rules, and precedents even if the writ is considered an "equitable" remedy.1 71 Justice Breyer noted that equitable rules guiding lower courts "reduce uncertainty, avoid unfair surprise, minimize disparate treatment of similar cases, and thereby help all litigants, including the State, whose interests in 'finality' such rules often further." 172 While criticizing any departure from settled rules, the Court was particularly concerned about ad hoc dismissals of first federal habeas petitions which would entirely deny petitioners the writ's protection. 173 The Court noted that Federal Habeas Corpus Rule 4 presents a concrete standard for deciding whether first habeas petitions are worthy for a court to consider, obviating the need for any ad hoc judgments. 174 As its third point, the Court emphasized that the use of ad hoc rules was unnecessary and inappropriate because Congress specifically addressed the main factor which led the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss Lonchar's petition-delay-in Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a).1 7 5 The Court noted that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 9(a) if by an unnecessary delay in filing the state is prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition. 176 However, the State specifically did not rely on Rule 9 (a), so the Eleventh Circuit's ad hoc "equitable" reasons for dismissal did not include a finding of prejudice. 17 7 The Court pointed out that when the Rules' framers included the prejudice requirement, they did so to acknowledge "the equitable maxim that a 168 Id.; See e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479-89 (1991) ; Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451 (1986) Furthermore, Justice Breyer recognized that (1) Congress rejected a draft Rule that would have eased the burden of the prejudice requirement by presuming prejudice after a delay of five years,' 8 0 and (2) since 1986 more than eighty bills proposing presumptions of prejudice after certain time periods have failed. 182 The Eleventh Circuit understood Gomez to mean a court could refuse a first habeas petition for generalized "equitable" reasons. 183 According to the Court, however, Gomez simply meant established "equitable" rules apply regardless of what vehicle a petitioner uses to bring a habeas petition.
18 4 Justice Breyer distinguished Gomez by emphasizing that "equitable" rules were appropriate there because it was the petitioner's fifth petition, not his first like that of Larry Lonchar.
185
The Court also examined its proposition in Gomez that a "'court may consider the last-minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief."186 In giving its fifth reason for allowing a stay of execution, the Court again stated that Gomez involved a successive petition, not a first, and that Habeas Corpus Rule 9 (b) directly authorizes dismissal of successive, not first, petitions for unduly late filings as "abuse of the writ." 18 7 Finally, Justice Breyer recognized that other circumstances upon which the Eleventh Circuit relied were unimportant and irrelevant to the Court's decision. 88 The "next friend" petitions did not aggravate or mitigate Lonchar's delay in filing his own petition; a possible statelaw procedural bar to the petition was at most an issue which required litigation and therefore a stay of execution; and consideration of Lonchar's motive was improper because his claim was valid on its 183 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (1995) . 184 195 Chief Justice Rehnquist began by acknowledging that the Court correctly determined there was no basis for denying a stay of execution since Lonchar's claims had merit. 196 However, he disagreed with the Court by drawing a distinction between denying a stay of execution based on a petition's merits and denying a stay of execution based on a petitioner's conduct. 197 The Chief Justice read Gomez broadly, deciding that "a habeas petitioner's misconduct in applying for a stay of execution may disentitle him to the stay even if the petition is his first."' 9 8 This conclusion was tenable, Rehnquist reasoned, because (1) Gomez stated that abusive delay and obvious manipulation attempts constituted equities for a court to consider in ruling on an execution stay, and (2) 
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quist pointed out that the Court in Gomez explicitly avoided vacating the stay because of the petition's merits, instead opting to dismiss the petition based on the petitioner's abusive conduct. 20 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist then criticized the majority's interpretation of Barefoot v. Estelle as a proposition that a court must grant a stay if it does not dismiss a first federal habeas petitionon the merits.
0 1
The Chief Justice emphasized that Barefoot only addressed how the merits of a habeas petition, and not the petitioner's conduct, may determine whether a petitioner obtains a stay. 2 0 2 He also pointed out language in the Barefoot decision which seems contradictory to the majority's belief that a decision on a first federal habeas petition is necessary to validate a state conviction: '[t] he role of federal habeas proceedings ... is secondary and limited.
Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials .... The procedures adopted to facilitate the orderly consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not legal entitlements that a defendant has a right to pursue irrespective of the contribution these procedures make toward uncovering constitutional error.' 2 03
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist eventually concurred with the Court's judgment in overturning the Eleventh Circuit's decision because he neither felt that a court could dismiss Lonchar's first federal habeas petition on its merits, nor felt that Lonchar's conduct had been abusive. and to protect the availability of first federal habeas corpus petitions. Gomez was sufficiently terse and vague to allow different valid interpretations of whether it permitted a court to dismiss a first petition based on a petitioner's abusive conduct. Justice Breyer could have entirely avoided this question based on the Court's unanimous opinion that Larry Lonchar's conduct was not abusive. 20 6 Instead, he chose to clarify the holding of Gomez and thereby prevent lower courts from using the SUPREME COURT REVIEW "abuse of the writ" doctrine to dismiss first federal habeas petitions. The petitioner in Gomez, Robert Alton Harris, brought a claim which contested California's method of execution as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 1 4 Rather than bringing the claim as a habeas corpus petition, he instead brought it as a member of a class-action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.215 Presumably it was the inapplicability of the Habeas Corpus Rules to this type of claim which led the Gomez court to decree that "[e]ven if we were to assume, however, that Harris could avoid the application of McCleskey to bar his claim, we would not consider it on the merits. Whether his claim is framed as a habeas petition or as a § 1983 action, Harris seeks an equitable remedy." His statement that "Gomez did not, and did not purport to, work a significant change in the law applicable to the dismissal of first habeas petitions" 2 25 finds strong support in the fact that the Gomez Court made specific reference to Harris having filed four previous petitions. 2 2 6 The Gomez Court was likely using this fact in the first paragraph to frame the later discussion concerning the applicability of the equitable rationale behind abuse of the writ doctrine.
7
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist saw a contrary significance to the mention of the four previous petitions. 228 Because of that reference's placement in the first paragraph, Rehnquist was of the opinion that the "[e]ven if.. ." language 22 9 of the second paragraph had to refer to all situations involving habeas petitions. 2 30 He proposed that if the second paragraph only referred to successive petitions, then it would have been superfluous. 2 31 This argument is not persuasive. While the per curiam opinion would probably accomplish the same objectives with or without the second of its two paragraphs, that does
